Towards a formal notion of impact metric for cyber-physical attacks
  (full version) by Lanotte, Ruggero et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
6.
10
46
3v
1 
 [c
s.L
O]
  2
7 J
un
 20
18
Towards a formal notion of impact metric for
cyber-physical attacks (full version)⋆
Ruggero Lanotte1, Massimo Merro2, and Simone Tini1
1 Dipartimento di Scienza e Alta Tecnologia, Universita` dell’Insubria, Como, Italy
{ruggero.lanotte,simone.tini}@uninsubria.it
2 Dipartimento di Informatica, Universita` degli Studi di Verona, Verona, Italy
massimo.merro@univr.it
Abstract. Industrial facilities and critical infrastructures are transform-
ing into “smart” environments that dynamically adapt to external events.
The result is an ecosystem of heterogeneous physical and cyber compo-
nents integrated in cyber-physical systems which are more and more
exposed to cyber-physical attacks, i.e., security breaches in cyberspace
that adversely affect the physical processes at the core of the systems.
We provide a formal compositional metric to estimate the impact of
cyber-physical attacks targeting sensor devices of IoT systems formalised
in a simple extension of Hennessy and Regan’s Timed Process Language.
Our impact metric relies on a discrete-time generalisation of Desharnais
et al.’s weak bisimulation metric for concurrent systems. We show the ad-
equacy of our definition on two different attacks on a simple surveillance
system.
1 Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is heavily affecting our daily lives in many domains,
ranging from tiny wearable devices to large industrial systems with thousands
of heterogeneous cyber and physical components that interact with each other.
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are integrations of networking and distributed
computing systems with physical processes, where feedback loops allow the latter
to affect the computations of the former and vice versa. Historically, CPSs re-
lied on proprietary technologies and were implemented as stand-alone networks
in physically protected locations. However, the growing connectivity and inte-
gration of these systems has triggered a dramatic increase in the number of
cyber-physical attacks [26], i.e., security breaches in cyberspace that adversely
affect the physical processes, e.g., manipulating sensor readings and, in general,
influencing physical processes to bring the system into a state desired by the at-
tacker.
Cyber-physical attacks are complex and challenging as they usually cross
the boundary between cyberspace and the physical world, possibly more than
⋆ An extended abstract will appear in the Proc. of the 14th International Conference
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once [14]. Some notorious examples are: (i) the Stuxnet worm, which repro-
grammed PLCs of nuclear centrifuges in Iran [9], (ii) the attack on a sewage
treatment facility in Queensland, Australia, which manipulated the SCADA sys-
tem to release raw sewage into local rivers [34], or the (iii) the recent BlackEnergy
cyber-attack on the Ukrainian power grid, again compromising the SCADA sys-
tem [18].
The points in common of these systems is that they are all safety critical
and failures may cause catastrophic consequences. Thus, the concern for conse-
quences at the physical level puts CPS security apart from standard IT security.
Timing is particularly relevant in CPS security because the physical state
of a system changes continuously over time and, as the system evolves in time,
some states might be more vulnerable to attacks than others [20]. For example,
an attack launched when the target state variable reaches a local maximum (or
minimum) may have a great impact on the whole system behaviour [21]. Also the
duration of the attack is an important parameter to be taken into consideration
in order to achieve a successful attack. For example, it may take minutes for a
chemical reactor to rupture [37], hours to heat a tank of water or burn out a
motor, and days to destroy centrifuges [9].
Actually, the estimation of the impact of cyber-physical attacks on the target
system is crucial when protecting CPSs [13]. For instance, in industrial CPSs,
before taking any countermeasure against an attack, engineers first try to esti-
mate the impact of the attack on the system functioning (e.g., performance and
security) and weight it against the cost of stopping the plant. If this cost is higher
than the damage caused by the attack (as is sometimes the case), then engineers
might actually decide to let the system continue its activities even under attack.
Thus, once an attack is detected, impact metrics are necessary to quantify the
perturbation introduced in the physical behaviour of the system under attack.
The goal of this paper is to lay theoretical foundations to provide formal
instruments to precisely define the notion of impact of cyber-physical attack
targeting physical devices, such as sensor devices of IoT systems. For that we
rely on a timed generalisation of bisimulation metrics [8,7,39] to compare the
behaviour of two systems up to a given tolerance, for time-bounded executions.
Weak bisimulation metric [8] allows us to compare two systems M and N ,
writing M ≃p N , if the weak bisimilarity holds with a distance or tolerance
p ∈ [0, 1], i.e., if M and N exhibit a different behaviour with probability p,
and the same behaviour with probability 1 − p. A useful generalisation is the
n-bisimulation metric [38] that takes into account bounded computations. In-
tuitively, the distance p is ensured only for the first n computational steps, for
some n ∈ N. However, in timed systems it is desirable to focus on the passage
of time rather than the number of computational steps. This would allow us to
deal with situations where it is not necessary (or it simply does not make sense)
to compare two systems “ad infinitum” but only for a limited amount of time.
Contribution. In this paper, we first introduce a general notion of timed bisim-
ulation metric for concurrent probabilistic systems equipped with a discrete no-
tion of time. Intuitively, this kind of metric allows us to derive a timed weak
bisimulation with tolerance, denoted with ≈kp, for k ∈ N
+ ∪ {∞} and p ∈ [0, 1],
to express that the tolerance p between two timed systems is ensured only for
the first k time instants (tick-actions). Then, we use our timed bisimulation met-
ric to set up a formal compositional theory to study and measure the impact of
cyber-physical attacks on IoT systems specified in a simple probabilistic timed
process calculus which extends Hennessy and Regan’s Timed Process Language
(TPL) [16]. IoT systems in our calculus are modelled by specifying: (i) a physi-
cal environment , containing informations on the physical state variables and the
sensor measurements, and (ii) a logics that governs both accesses to sensors and
channel-based communications with other cyber components.
We focus on attacks on sensors that may eavesdrop and possibly modify the
sensor measurements provided to the controllers of sensors, affecting both the
integrity and the availability of the system under attack.
In order to make security assessments of our IoT systems, we adapt a well-
know approach calledGeneralized Non Deducibility on Composition (GNDC) [10]
to compare the behaviour of an IoT system M with the behaviour of the same
system under attack, written M ‖ A, for some arbitrary cyber-physical attack
A. This comparison makes use of our timed bisimulation metric to evaluate not
only the tolerance and the vulnerability of a system M with respect to a certain
attack A, but also the impact of a successful attack in terms of the deviation
introduced in the behaviour of the target system. In particular, we say that
a system M tolerates an attack A if M ‖ A ≈∞0 M , i.e., the presence of A
does not affect the behaviour of M ; whereas M is said to be vulnerable to A in
the time interval m..n with impact p if m..n is the smallest interval such that
M ‖ A ≈m−10 M and M ‖ A ≈
k
p M , for any k ≥ n, i.e., if the perturbation
introduced by the attack A becomes observable in the m-th time slot and yields
the maximum impact p in the n-th time slot. In the concluding discussion we
will show that the temporal vulnerability window m..n provides several informa-
tions about the corresponding attack, such as stealthiness capability, duration
of the physical effects of the attack, and consequent room for possible run-time
countermeasures.
As a case study, we use our timed bisimulation metric to measure the impact
of two different attacks injecting false positives and false negative, respectively,
into a simple surveillance system expressed in our process calculus.
Outline. Section 2 formalises our timed bisimulation metrics in a general setting.
Section 3 provides a simple calculus of IoT systems. Section 4 defines cyber-
physical attacks together with the notions of tolerance and vulnerability w.r.t.
an attack. In Section 5 we use our metrics to evaluate the impact of two attacks
on a simple surveillance system. Section 6 draws conclusions and discusses related
and future work. In this extended abstract proofs are omitted, full details of the
proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 Timed Bisimulation Metrics
In this section, we introduce timed bisimulation metrics as a general instrument
to derive a notion of timed and approximate weak bisimulation between proba-
bilistic systems equipped with a discrete notion of time. In Section 2.1, we recall
the semantic model of nondeterministic probabilistic labelled transition systems ;
in Section 2.2, we present our metric semantics.
2.1 Nondeterministic Probabilistic Labelled Transition Systems
Nondeterministic probabilistic labelled transition systems (pLTS) [33] combine
classic LTSs [19] and discrete-time Markov chains [15,35] to model, at the same
time, reactive behaviour, nondeterminism and probability. We first provide the
mathematical machinery required to define a pLTS.
The state space in a pLTS is given by a set T , whose elements are called
processes, or terms. We use t, t′, .. to range over T . A (discrete) probability sub-
distribution over T is a mapping ∆ : T → [0, 1], with
∑
t∈T ∆(t) ∈ (0, 1]. We
denote
∑
t∈T ∆(t) by |∆ |, and we say that ∆ is a probability distribution if
|∆|= 1. The support of ∆ is given by ⌈∆⌉ = {t ∈ T : ∆(t) > 0}. The set of all
sub-distributions (resp. distributions) over T with finite support will be denoted
with Dsub(T ) (resp. D(T )). We use ∆, Θ, Φ to range over Dsub(T ) and D(T ).
Definition 1 (pLTS [33]). A pLTS is a triple (T ,A,−→), where: (i) T is a
countable set of terms, (ii) A is a countable set of actions, and (iii) −→⊆
T ×A×D(T ) is a transition relation.
In Definition 1, we assume the presence of a special deadlocked term Dead ∈ T .
Furthermore, we assume that the set of actions A contains at least two actions:
τ and tick. The former to model internal computations that cannot be externally
observed, while the latter denotes the passage of one time unit in a setting with
a discrete notion of time [16]. In particular, tick is the only timed action in A.
We write t
α
−→ ∆ for (t, α,∆)∈−→, t
α
−→ if there is a distribution ∆ ∈ D(T )
with t
α
−→ ∆, and t
α
−→6 otherwise. Let der (t, α) = {∆ ∈ D(T ) | t
α
−→ ∆} denote
the set of the derivatives (i.e. distributions) reachable from term t through action
α. We say that a pLTS is image-finite [17] if der(t, α) is finite for all t ∈ T and
α ∈ A. In this paper, we will always work with image-finite pLTSs.
Weak transitions. As we are interested in developing a weak bisimulation metric,
we need a definition of weak transition which abstracts away from τ -actions. In a
probabilistic setting, the definition of weak transition is somewhat complicated
by the fact that (strong) transitions take terms to distributions; consequently
if we are to use weak transitions then we need to generalise transitions, so that
they take (sub-)distributions to (sub-)distributions.
To this end, we need some extra notation on distributions. For a term t ∈ T ,
the point (Dirac) distribution at t, denoted t, is defined by t(t) = 1 and t(t′) = 0
for all t′ 6= t. Then, the convex combination
∑
i∈I pi ·∆i of a family {∆i}i∈I of
(sub-)distributions, with I a finite set of indexes, pi ∈ (0, 1] and
∑
i∈I pi ≤ 1,
is the (sub-)distribution defined by (
∑
i∈I pi ·∆i)(t)
def
=
∑
i∈I pi ·∆i(t) for all
t ∈ T . We write
∑
i∈I pi ·∆i as p1 ·∆1 + . . .+ pn ·∆n when I = {1, . . . , n}.
Along the lines of [6], we write t
τˆ
−→ ∆, for some term t and some distribution
∆, if either t
τ
−→ ∆ or ∆ = t. Then, for α 6= τ , we write t
αˆ
−→ ∆ if t
α
−→ ∆.
Relation
αˆ
−→ is extended to model transitions from sub-distributions to sub-
distributions. For a sub-distribution ∆ =
∑
i∈I pi · ti, we write ∆
αˆ
−→ Θ if there
is a non-empty set of indexes J ⊆ I such that: (i) tj
αˆ
−→ Θj for all j ∈ J ,
(ii) ti
αˆ
−→6 , for all i ∈ I \ J , and (iii) Θ =
∑
j∈J pj · Θj . Note that if α 6= τ
then this definition admits that only some terms in the support of ∆ make the
αˆ
−→ transition. Then, we define the weak transition relation
τˆ
=⇒ as the transitive
and reflexive closure of
τˆ
−→, i.e.,
τˆ
=⇒= (
τˆ
−→)∗, while for α 6= τ we let
αˆ
=⇒ denote
τˆ
=⇒
αˆ
−→
τˆ
=⇒.
2.2 Timed Weak Bisimulation with Tolerance
In this section, we define a family of relations ≈kp over T , with p ∈ [0, 1] and k ∈
N
+ ∪ {∞}, where, intuitively, t ≈kp t
′ means that t and t′ can weakly bisimulate
each other with a tolerance p accumulated in k timed steps. This is done by
introducing a family of pseudometrics mk : T × T → [0, 1] and defining t ≈kp t
′
iffmk(t, t′) = p. The pseudometricsmk will have the following properties for any
t, t′ ∈ T : (i) mk1(t, t′) ≤ mk2(t, t′) whenever k1 < k2 (tolerance monotonicity);
(ii) m∞(t, t′) = p iff p is the distance between t and t′ as given by the weak
bisimilarity metric in [8] in an untimed setting; (iii) m∞(t, t′) = 0 iff t and t′ are
related by the standard weak probabilistic bisimilarity [30].
Let us recall the standard definition of pseudometric.
Definition 2 (Pseudometric). A function d : T × T → [0, 1] is a 1-bounded
pseudometric over T if
– d(t, t) = 0 for all t ∈ T ,
– d(t, t′) = d(t′, t) for all t, t′ ∈ T (symmetry),
– d(t, t′) ≤ d(t, t′′) + d(t′′, t′) for all t, t′, t′′ ∈ T (triangle inequality).
In order to define the family of functions mk, we define an auxiliary family
of functions mk,h : T × T → [0, 1], with k, h ∈ N, quantifying the tolerance of
the weak bisimulation after a sequence of computation steps such that: (i) the
sequence contains exactly k tick-actions, (ii) the sequence terminates with a
tick-action, (iii) any term performs exactly h untimed actions before the first
tick-action, (iv) between any i-th and (i+1)-th tick-action, with 1 ≤ i < k, there
are an arbitrary number of untimed actions.
The definition ofmk,h relies on a timed and quantitative version of the classic
bisimulation game: The tolerance between t and t′ as given by mk,h(t, t′) can be
below a threshold ǫ ∈ [0, 1] only if each transition t
α
−→ ∆ is mimicked by a weak
transition t′
αˆ
=⇒ Θ such that the bisimulation tolerance between ∆ and Θ is, in
turn, below ǫ. This requires to lift pseudometrics over T to pseudometrics over
(sub-)distributions inDsub(T ). To this end, we adopt the notions ofmatching [43]
(also called coupling) and Kantorovich lifting [5].
Definition 3 (Matching). A matching for a pair of distributions (∆,Θ) ∈
D(T )×D(T ) is a distribution ω in the state product space D(T × T ) such that:
–
∑
t′∈T ω(t, t
′) = ∆(t), for all t ∈ T , and
–
∑
t∈T ω(t, t
′) = Θ(t′), for all t′ ∈ T .
We write Ω(∆,Θ) to denote the set of all matchings for (∆,Θ).
A matching for (∆,Θ) may be understood as a transportation schedule for the
shipment of probability mass from ∆ to Θ [43].
Definition 4 (Kantorovich lifting). Assume a pseudometric d : T × T →
[0, 1]. The Kantorovich lifting of d is the function K(d) : D(T )× D(T ) → [0, 1]
defined for distributions ∆ and Θ as:
K(d)(∆,Θ)
def
= minω∈Ω(∆,Θ)
∑
s,t∈T ω(s, t) · d(s, t).
Note that since we are considering only distributions with finite support, the
minimum over the set of matchings Ω(∆,Θ) used in Definition 4 is well defined.
Pseudometrics mk,h are inductively defined on k and h by means of suitable
functionals over the complete lattice ([0, 1]T ×T ,⊑) of functions of type T ×T →
[0, 1], ordered by d1 ⊑ d2 iff d1(t, t′) ≤ d2(t, t′) for all t, t′ ∈ T . Notice that in this
lattice, for each set D ⊆ [0, 1]T ×T , the supremum and infimum are defined as
sup(D)(t, t′) = supd∈D d(t, t
′) and inf(D)(t, t′) = infd∈D d(t, t
′), for all t, t′ ∈ T .
The infimum of the lattice is the constant function zero, denoted by 0, and the
supremum is the constant function one, denoted by 1.
Definition 5 (Functionals for mk,h). The functionals B,Btick : [0, 1]
T ×T →
[0, 1]T ×T are defined for any function d ∈ [0, 1]T ×T and terms t, t′ ∈ T as:
B(d)(t, t′) = max{ d(t, t′),
sup
α∈A\{tick}
max
t
α−→∆
inf
t′
αˆ
=⇒Θ
K(d)
(
∆,Θ + (1− |Θ|)Dead
)
,
sup
α∈A\{tick}
max
t′
α−→Θ
inf
t
αˆ
=⇒∆
K(d)
(
∆+ (1− |∆|)Dead, Θ
)
}
Btick(d)(t, t
′) = max{ d(t, t′),
max
t
tick−−→∆
inf
t′
t̂ick
==⇒Θ
K(d)
(
∆,Θ + (1− |Θ|)Dead
)
,
max
t′
tick−−→Θ
inf
t
t̂ick
==⇒∆
K(d)
(
∆+ (1− |∆|)Dead, Θ
)
}
where inf ∅ = 1 and max ∅ = 0.
Notice that all max in Definition 5 are well defined since the pLTS is image-
finite. Notice also that any strong transitions from t to a distribution ∆ is mim-
icked by a weak transition from t′, which, in general, takes to a sub-distribution
Θ. Thus, process t′ may not simulate t with probability 1− |Θ|.
Definition 6 (Timed weak bisimilarity metrics). The family of the timed
weak bisimilarity metrics mk : (T × T ) → [0, 1] is defined for all k ∈ N by
mk =
{
0 if k = 0
suph∈Nm
k,h if k > 0
while the functionsmk,h : (T ×T )→ [0, 1] are defined for all k ∈ N+ and h ∈ N by
mk,h =
{
Btick(m
k−1) if h = 0
B(mk,h−1) if h > 0.
Then, we define m∞ : (T × T )→ [0, 1] as m∞ = supk∈Nm
k.
Note that any mk,h is obtained from mk−1 by one application of the functional
Btick, in order to take into account the distance between terms introduced by the
k-th tick-action, and h applications of the functional B, in order to lift such a
distance to terms that take h untimed actions to be able to perform a tick-action.
By taking suph∈Nm
k,h we consider an arbitrary number of untimed steps.
The pseudometric property ofmk is necessary to conclude that the tolerance
between terms as given by mk is a reasonable notion of behavioural distance.
Theorem 1. For any k ≥ 1, mk is a 1-bounded pseudometric.
Finally, everything is in place to define our timed weak bisimilarity ≈kp with
tolerance p ∈ [0, 1] accumulated after k time units, for k ∈ N ∪ {∞}.
Definition 7 (Timed weak bisimilarity with tolerance). Let t, t′ ∈ T ,
k ∈ N and p ∈ [0, 1]. We say that t and t′ are weakly bisimilar with a tolerance p,
which accumulates in k timed actions, written t ≈kp t
′, if and only ifmk(t, t′) = p.
Then, we write t ≈∞p t
′ if and only if m∞(t, t′) = p.
Since the Kantorovich lifting K is monotone [29], it follows that both func-
tionals B and Btick are monotone. This implies that, for any k ≥ 1, (mk,h)h≥0 is
a non-decreasing chain and, analogously, also (mk)k≥0 is a non-decreasing chain,
thus giving the following expected result saying that the distance between terms
grows when we consider a higher number of tick computation steps.
Proposition 1 (Tolerance monotonicity). For all terms t, t′ ∈ T and k1, k2 ∈
N
+ with k1 < k2, t ≈k1p1 t
′ and t ≈k2p2 t
′ entail p1 ≤ p2.
We conclude this section by comparing our behavioural distance with the
behavioural relations known in the literature.
We recall that in [8] a family of relations ≃p for untimed process calculi
are defined such that t ≃p t
′ if and only if t and t′ weakly bisimulate each
other with tolerance p. Of course, one can apply these relations also to timed
process calculi, the effect being that timed actions are treated in exactly the
same manner as untimed actions. The following result compares the behavioural
metrics proposed in the present paper with those of [8], and with the classical
notions of probabilistic weak bisimilarity [30] denoted ≈.
Proposition 2. Let t, t′ ∈ T and p ∈ [0, 1]. Then,
– t ≈∞p t
′ iff t ≃p t′
– t ≈∞0 t
′ iff t ≈ t′.
3 A Simple Probabilistic Timed Calculus for IoT Systems
In this section, we propose a simple extension of Hennessy and Regan’s timed
process algebra TPL [16] to express IoT systems and cyber-physical attacks . The
goal is to show that timed weak bisimilarity with tolerance is a suitable notion
to estimate the impact of cyber-physical attacks on IoT systems.
Let us start with some preliminary notations.
Notation 1 We use x, xk for state variables, c, ck, for communication channels,
z,zk for communication variables, s, sk for sensors devices, while o ranges over
both channels and sensors. Values, ranged over by v, v′, belong to a finite set of
admissible values V. We use u, uk for both values and communication variables.
Given a generic set of names N , we write VN to denote the set of functions
N → V assigning a value to each name in N . For m ∈ N and n ∈ N ∪ {∞}, we
write m..n to denote an integer interval. As we will adopt a discrete notion of
time, we will use integer intervals to denote time intervals.
State variables are associated to physical properties like temperature, pressure,
etc. Sensor names are metavariables for sensor devices, such as thermometers
and barometers. Please, notice that in cyber-physical systems, state variables
cannot be directly accessed but they can only be tested via one or more sensors.
Definition 8 (IoT system). Let X be a set of state variables and S be a set of
sensors. Let range : X → 2V be a total function returning the range of admissible
values for any state variable x ∈ X . An IoT system consists of two components:
– a physical environment ξ = 〈ξx, ξm〉 where:
• ξx ∈ VX is the physical state of the system that associates a value to
each state variable in X , such that ξx(x) ∈ range(x) for any x ∈ X ,
• ξm : VX → S → D(V) is the measurement map that given a physical
state returns a function that associates to any sensor in S a discrete
probability distribution over the set of possible sensed values;
– a logical (or cyber) component P that interacts with the sensors defined in
ξ, and can communicate, via channels, with other cyber components.
We write ξ⋊⋉P to denote the resulting IoT system, and use M and N to range
over IoT systems.
Let us now formalise the cyber component of an IoT system. Basically, we
adapt Hennessy and Regan’s timed process algebra TPL [16].
Definition 9 (Logics). Logical components of IoT systems are defined by the
following grammar:
P,Q ::= nil
∣∣ tick.P ∣∣ P ‖ Q ∣∣ ⌊pfx .P ⌋Q ∣∣ H〈u˜〉 ∣∣ if (b) {P} else {Q} ∣∣ P\c
pfx ::= o!v
∣∣ o?(z)
The process tick.P sleeps for one time unit and then continues as P . We write
P ‖ Q to denote the parallel composition of concurrent processes P and Q. The
process ⌊pfx .P ⌋Q denotes prefixing with timeout. We recall that o ranges over
both channel and sensor names. Thus, for instance, ⌊c!v.P ⌋Q sends the value
v on channel c and, after that, it continues as P ; otherwise, if no communica-
tion partner is available within one time unit, it evolves into Q. The process
⌊c?(z).P ⌋Q is the obvious counterpart for channel reception. On the other hand,
the process ⌊s?(z).P ⌋Q reads the sensor s, according to the measurement map
of the systems, and, after that, it continues as P . The process ⌊s!v.P ⌋Q writes
to the sensor s and, after that, it continues as P ; here, we wish to point out
that this a malicious activity, as controllers may only access sensors for reading
sensed data. Thus, the construct ⌊s!v.P ⌋Q serves to implement an integrity at-
tack that attempts at synchronising with the controller of sensor s to provide a
fake value v. In the following, we say that a process is honest if it never writes
on sensors. The definition of honesty naturally lifts to IoT systems. In processes
of the form tick.Q and ⌊pfx .P ⌋Q, the occurrence of Q is said to be time-guarded.
Recursive processes H〈u˜〉 are defined via equations H(z1, . . . , zk) = P , where
(i) the tuple z1, . . . , zk contains all the variables that appear free in P , and (ii)
P contains only time-guarded occurrences of the process identifiers, such as H
itself (to avoid zeno behaviours). The two remaining constructs are standard;
they model conditionals and channel restriction, respectively.
Finally, we define how to compose IoT systems. For simplicity, we compose
two systems only if they have the same physical environment.
Definition 10 (System composition). Let M1 = ξ⋊⋉P1 and M2 = ξ⋊⋉P2 be
two IoT systems, and Q be a process whose sensors are defined in the physical
environment ξ. We write:
– M1 ‖M2 to denote ξ⋊⋉ (P1 ‖ P2);
– M1 ‖ Q to denote ξ⋊⋉ (P1 ‖ Q);
– M1\c as an abbreviation for ξ⋊⋉ (P1\c).
We conclude this section with the following abbreviations that will be used
in the rest of the paper.
Notation 2 We write P\{c1, c2, . . . , cn}, or P\c˜, to mean P\c1\c2 · · · \cn. For
simplicity, we sometimes abbreviate both H(i) and H〈i〉 with Hi. We write pfx .P
as an abbreviation for the process defined via the equation H = ⌊pfx .P ⌋H , where
the process name H does not occur in P . We write tickk.P as a shorthand for
tick.tick. . . . tick.P , where the prefix tick appears k ≥ 0 consecutive times. We
write Dead to denote a deadlocked IoT system that cannot perform any action.
3.1 Probabilistic labelled transition semantics
As said before, sensors serve to observe the evolution of the physical state of an
IoT system. However, sensors are usually affected by an error/noise that we rep-
resent in our measurement maps by means of discrete probability distributions.
For this reason, we equip our calculus with a probabilistic labelled transition
system. In the following, the symbol ǫ ranges over distributions on physical envi-
ronments, whereas π ranges over distributions on (logical) processes. Thus, ǫ⋊⋉π
(Write)
−
⌊o!v.P ⌋Q
o!v
−−−→ P
(Read)
−
⌊o?(z).P ⌋Q
o?(z)
−−−−−→ P
(Sync)
P
o!v
−−−→ P ′ Q
o?(z)
−−−−−→ Q′
P ‖ Q
τ
−−→ P ′ ‖ Q′{v/z}
(Par)
P
λ
−−→ P ′ λ 6= tick
P ‖ Q
λ
−−→ P ′ ‖ Q
(Res)
P
λ
−−→ P ′ λ 6∈ {o!v, o?(z)}
P\o
λ
−−→ P ′\o
(Rec)
P{v˜/˜z}
λ
−−→ Q H(z˜) = P
H〈v˜〉
λ
−−→ Q
(Then)
JbK = true P
λ
−−→ P ′
if (b) {P} else {Q}
λ
−−→ P ′
(Else)
JbK = false Q
λ
−−→ Q′
if (b) {P} else {Q}
λ
−−→ Q′
(TimeNil)
−
nil
tick
−−−→ nil
(Delay)
−
tick.P
tick
−−−→ P
(Timeout)
−
⌊pfx .P ⌋Q
tick
−−−→ Q
(TimePar)
P
tick
−−−→ P ′ Q
tick
−−−→ Q′
P ‖ Q
tick
−−−→ P ′ ‖ Q′
Table 1. Labelled transition system for processes
denotes the distribution over IoT systems defined by (ǫ⋊⋉π)(ξ⋊⋉P ) = ǫ(ξ) ·π(P ).
The symbol γ ranges over distributions on IoT systems.
In Table 1, we give a standard labelled transition system for logical compo-
nents (timed processes), whereas in Table 2 we rely on the LTS of Table 1 to
define a simple pLTS for IoT systems by lifting transition rules from processes
to systems.
In Table 1, the meta-variable λ ranges over labels in the set {τ, tick, o!v, o?(z)}.
Rule (Sync) serve to model synchronisation and value passing, on some name (for
channel or sensor) o: if o is a channel then we have standard point-to-point com-
munication, whereas if o is a sensor then this rule models an integrity attack on
sensor s, as the controller is provided with a fake value v. The remaining rules
are standard. The symmetric counterparts of rules (Sync) and (Par) are omitted.
According to Table 2, IoT systems may fire four possible actions ranged over
by α. These actions represent: internal activities (τ), the passage of time (tick),
channel transmission (c!v) and channel reception (c?v).
Rules (Snd) and (Rcv) model transmission and reception on a channel c with
an external system, respectively. Rule (SensRead)models the reading of the value
detected at a sensor s according to the current physical environment ξ = 〈ξx, ξm〉.
In particular, this rule says that if a process P in a system ξ⋊⋉P reads a sensor
s defined in ξ then it will get a value that may vary according to the probability
distribution resulting by providing the state function ξx and the sensor s to the
measurement map ξm.
Rule (Tau) lifts internal actions from processes to systems. This includes
communications on channels and malicious accesses to sensors’ controllers. Ac-
(Snd)
P
c!v
−−−→ P ′
ξ⋊⋉P
c!v
−−−→ ξ⋊⋉P ′
(Rcv)
P
c?(z)
−−−−−→ P ′
ξ⋊⋉P
c?v
−−−→ ξ⋊⋉P ′{v/z}
(SensRead)
P
s?(z)
−−−−−→ P ′ ξm(ξx)(s) =
∑
i∈I
pi · vi
ξ⋊⋉P
τ
−−→ ξ⋊⋉
∑
i∈I
pi · P ′{vi/z}
(Tau)
P
τ
−−→ P ′
ξ⋊⋉P
τ
−−→ ξ⋊⋉P ′
(Time)
P
tick
−−−→ P ′ ξ⋊⋉P
τ
−−→6 ξ′ ∈ next(ξ)
ξ⋊⋉P
tick
−−−→ ξ′⋊⋉P ′
Table 2. Probabilistic LTS for a IoT system ξ⋊⋉P with ξ = 〈ξx, ξm〉
cording to Definition 10, rule (Tau) models also channel communication between
two parallel IoT systems sharing the same physical environment.
A second lifting occurs in rule (Time) for timed actions tick. Here, ξ′ denotes
an admissible physical environment for the next time slot, nondeterministically
chosen from the finite set next(〈ξx, ξm〉). This set is defined as {〈ξ
′
x, ξm〉 : ξ
′
x(x) ∈
range(x) for any x ∈ X}.3 As a consequence, the rules in Table 2 define an
image-finite pLTS.
For simplicity, we abstract from the physical process behind our IoT systems.
4 Cyber-physical attacks on sensor devices
In this section, we consider attacks tampering with sensors by eavesdropping
and possibly modifying the sensor measurements provided to the corresponding
controllers. These attacks may affect both the integrity and the availability of
the system under attack. We do not represent (well-known) attacks on communi-
cation channels as our focus is on attacks to physical devices and the consequent
impact on the physical state. However, our technique can be easily generalised
to deal with attacks on channels as well.
Definition 11 (Cyber-physical attack). A (pure) cyber-physical attack A is
a process derivable from the grammar of Definition 9 such that:
– A writes on at least one sensor;
– A never uses communication channels.
In order to make security assessments on our IoT systems, we adapt a well-
known approach calledGeneralized Non Deducibility on Composition (GNDC) [10].
Intuitively, an attack A affects an honest IoT system M if the execution of the
composed systemM ‖ A differs from that of the original systemM in an observ-
able manner. Basically, a cyber-physical attack can influence the system under
attack in at least two different ways:
3 The finiteness follows from the finiteness of V, and hence of range(x), for any x ∈ X .
– The system M ‖ A might have non-genuine execution traces containing
observables that cannot be reproduced by M ; here the attack affects the
integrity of the system behaviour (integrity attack).
– The system M might have execution traces containing observables that can-
not be reproduced by the system under attack M ‖ A (because they are
prevented by the attack); this is an attack against the availability of the
system (DoS attack).
Now, everything is in place to provide a formal definition of system tolerance
and system vulnerability with respect to a given attack. Intuitively, a system M
tolerates an attack A if the presence of the attack does not affect the behaviour
of M ; on the other hand M is vulnerable to A in a certain time interval if the
attack has an impact on the behaviour of M in that time interval.
Definition 12 (Attack tolerance). Let M be a honest IoT system. We say
that M tolerates an attack A if M ‖ A ≈∞0 M .
Definition 13 (Attack vulnerability and impact). Let M be a honest IoT
system. We say that M is vulnerable to an attack A in the time interval m..n
with impact p ∈ [0, 1], for m ∈ N+ and n ∈ N+∪{∞}, if m..n is the smallest time
interval such that: (i) M ‖ A ≈m−10 M , (ii) M ‖ A ≈
n
p M , (iii) M ‖ A ≈
∞
p M .
4
Basically, the definition above says that if a system is vulnerable to an attack in
the time interval m..n then the perturbation introduced by the attack starts in
the m-th time slot and reaches the maximum impact in the n-th time slot.
The following result says that both notions of tolerance and vulnerability
are suitable for compositional reasonings . More precisely, we prove that they are
both preserved by parallel composition and channel restriction. Actually, channel
restriction may obviously make a system less vulnerable by hiding channels.
Theorem 2 (Compositionality). Let M1 = ξ⋊⋉P1 and M2 = ξ⋊⋉P2 be two
honest IoT systems with the same physical environment ξ, A an arbitrary attack,
and c˜ a set of channels.
– If both M1 and M2 tolerate A then (M1 ‖M2)\c˜ tolerates A.
– If M1 is vulnerable to A in the time interval m1..n1 with impact p1, and M2
is vulnerable to A in the time interval m2..n2 with impact p2, then M1 ‖M2
is vulnerable to A in a the time interval min(m1,m2)..max(n1, n2) with an
impact p′ ≤ (p1 + p2 − p1p2).
– If M1 is vulnerable to A in the interval m1..n1 with impact p1 then M1\c˜ is
vulnerable to A in a time interval m′..n′ ⊆ m1..n1 with an impact p′ ≤ p1.
Note that if an attack A is tolerated by a system M and can interact with
a honest process P then the compound system M ‖ P may be vulnerable to
A. However, if A does not write on the sensors of P then it is tolerated by
M ‖ P as well. The bound p′ ≤ (p1 + p2 − p1p2) can be explained as follows.
4 By Proposition 1, at all time instants greater than n the impact remains p.
The likelihood that the attack does not impact on Mi is (1 − pi), for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Thus, the likelihood that the attack impacts neither on M1 nor onM2 is at least
(1− p1)(1− p2). Summarising, the likelihood that the attack impacts on at least
one of the two systemsM1 andM2 is at most 1−(1−p1)(1−p2) = p1+p2−p1p2.
An easy corollary of Theorem 2 allows us to lift the notions of tolerance and
vulnerability from a honest system M to the compound systems M ‖ P , for a
honest process P .
Corollary 1. Let M be a honest system, A an attack, c˜ a set of channels, and
P a honest process that reads sensors defined in M but not those written by A.
– If M tolerates A then (M ‖ P )\c˜ tolerates A.
– If M is vulnerable to A in the interval m..n with impact p, then (M ‖ P )\c˜
is vulnerable to A in a time interval m′..n′ ⊆ m..n, with an impact p′ ≤ p.
5 Attacking a smart surveillance system: A case study
Consider an alarmed ambient consisting of three rooms, ri for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, each
of which equipped with a sensor si to detect unauthorised accesses. The alarm
goes off if at least one of the three sensors detects an intrusion.
The logics of the system can be easily specified in our language as follows:
Sys = (Mng ‖ Ctrl1 ‖ Ctrl2 ‖ Ctrl3 ) \{c1, c2, c3}
Mng = c1?(z1).c2?(z2).c3?(z3).if (
∨3
i=1 zi=on) {alarm!on.tick.Checkk} else {tick.Mng}
Check0 = Mng
Checkj = alarm!on.c1?(z1).c2?(z2).c3?(z3).if (
∨3
i=1 zi = on) {tick.Checkk}
else {tick.Checkj−1} for j > 0
Ctrli = si?(zi).if (zi=presence) {ci!on.tick.Ctrli} else {ci!off.tick.Ctrli} for i∈{1, 2, 3}.
Intuitively, the process Sys is composed by three controllers, Ctrli , one for
each sensor si, and a managerMng that interacts with the controllers via private
channels ci. The process Mng fires an alarm if at least one of the controllers
signals an intrusion. As usual in this kind of surveillance systems, the alarm will
keep going off for k instants of time after the last detected intrusion.
As regards the physical environment, the physical state ξx : {r1, r2, r3} →
{presence, absence} is set to ξx(ri) = absence, for any i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Furthermore,
let p+i and p
−
i be the probabilities of having false positives (erroneously detected
intrusion) and false negatives (erroneously missed intrusion) at sensor si
5, re-
spectively, for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the measurement function ξm is defined as follows:
ξm(ξx)(si) = (1−p
−
i ) presence + p
−
i absence, if ξx(ri) = presence; ξm(ξx)(si) =
(1−p+i ) absence+ p
+
i presence, otherwise.
Thus, the whole IoT system has the form ξ⋊⋉Sys , with ξ = 〈ξx, ξm〉.
We start our analysis studying the impact of a simple cyber-physical attack
that provides fake false positives to the controller of one of the sensors si. This
attack affects the integrity of the system behaviour as the system under attack
will fire alarms without any physical intrusion.
5 These probabilities are usually very small; we assume them smaller than 1
2
.
Example 1 (Introducing false positives). In this example, we provide an attack
that tries to increase the number of false positives detected by the controller of
some sensor si during a specific time interval m..n, with m,n ∈ N, n ≥ m > 0.
Intuitively, the attack waits for m− 1 time slots, then, during the time interval
m..n, it provides the controller of sensor si with a fake intrusion signal. Formally,
Afp(i,m, n) = tick
m−1.B〈i, n−m+ 1〉
B(i, j) = if (j = 0) {nil} else {⌊si!presence.tick.B〈i, j − 1〉⌋B〈i, j − 1〉} .
In the following proposition, we use our metric to measure the perturbation
introduced by the attack to the controller of a sensor si by varying the time of
observation of the system under attack.
Proposition 3. Let ξ be an arbitrary physical state for the systems Mi =
ξ⋊⋉Ctrl i, for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Then,
– Mi ‖ Afp〈i,m, n〉 ≈
j
0 Mi, for j ∈ 1..m−1;
– Mi ‖ Afp〈i,m, n〉 ≈
j
h Mi, with h = 1− (p
+
i )
j−m+1, for j ∈ m..n;
– Mi ‖ Afp〈i,m, n〉 ≈jr Mi, with r = 1− (p
+
i )
n−m+1, for j > n or j =∞.
By an application of Definition 13 we can measure the impact of the attack Afp
to the (sub)systems ξ⋊⋉Ctrli .
Corollary 2. The IoT systems ξ⋊⋉Ctrli are vulnerable to the attack Afp〈i,m, n〉
in the time interval m..n with impact 1− (p+i )
n−m+1.
Note that the vulnerability window m..n coincides with the activity period of
the attack Afp. This means that the system under attack recovers its normal be-
haviour immediately after the termination of the attack. However, in general, an
attack may impact the behaviour of the target system long after its termination.
Note also that the attack Afp〈i,m, n〉 has an impact not only on the controller
Ctrl i but also on the whole system ξ⋊⋉ Sys . This because the process Mng will
surely fire the alarm as it will receive at least one intrusion detection from Ctrl i.
However, by an application of Corollary 1 we can prove that the impact on the
whole system will not get amplified.
Proposition 4 (Impact of the attack Afp). The system ξ⋊⋉Sys is vulnerable
to the attack Afp〈i,m, n〉 in a time interval m′..n′ ⊆ m..n with impact p′ ≤
1− (p+i )
n−m+1.
Now, the reader may wonder what happens if we consider a complementary
attack that provides fake false negatives to the controller of one of the sensors
si. In this case, the attack affects the availability of the system behaviour as the
system will no fire the alarm in the presence of a real intrusion. This because a
real intrusion will be somehow “hidden” by the attack.
Example 2 (Introducing false negatives). The goal of the following attack is to
increase the number of false negatives during the time interval m..n, with n ≥
m > 0. Formally, the attack is defined as follows:
Afn(i,m, n) = tick
m−1.C〈i, n−m+ 1〉
C(i, j) = if (j = 0) {nil} else {⌊si!absence.tick.C〈i, j − 1〉⌋C〈i, j − 1〉} .
In the following proposition, we use our metric to measure the deviation intro-
duced by the attack Afn to the controller of a sensor si. With no surprise we get
a result that is the symmetric version of Proposition 3.
Proposition 5. Let ξ be an arbitrary physical state for the systemMi = ξ⋊⋉Ctrl i,
for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Then,
– Mi ‖ Afn〈i,m, n〉 ≈
j
0 Mi, for j ∈ 1..m−1;
– Mi ‖ Afn〈i,m, n〉 ≈
j
h Mi, with h = 1− (p
−
i )
j−m+1, for j ∈ m..n;
– Mi ‖ Afn〈i,m, n〉 ≈jr Mi, with r = 1− (p
−
i )
n−m+1, for j > n or j =∞.
Again, by an application of Definition 13 we can measure the impact of the
attack Afn to the (sub)systems ξ⋊⋉Ctrli .
Corollary 3. The IoT systems ξ⋊⋉Ctrli are vulnerable to the attack Afn〈i,m, n〉
in the time interval m..n with impact 1− (p−i )
n−m+1.
As our timed metric is compositional, by an application of Corollary 1 we
can estimate the impact of the attack Afn to the whole system ξ⋊⋉Sys .
Proposition 6 (Impact of the attack Afn). The system ξ⋊⋉Sys is vulnerable
to the attack Afn〈i,m, n〉 in a time interval m′..n′ ⊆ m..n with impact p′ ≤
1− (p−i )
n−m+1.
6 Conclusions, related and future work
We have proposed a timed generalisation of the n-bisimulation metric [38], called
timed bisimulation metric, obtained by defining two functionals over the complete
lattice of the functions assigning a distance in [0, 1] to each pair of systems: the
former deals with the distance accumulated when executing untimed steps, the
latter with the distance introduced by timed actions.
We have used our timed bisimulation metrics to provide a formal and com-
positional notion of impact metric for cyber-physical attacks on IoT systems
specified in a simple timed process calculus. In particular, we have focussed on
cyber-physical attacks targeting sensor devices (attack on sensors are by far the
most studied cyber-physical attacks [44]). We have used our timed weak bisim-
ulation with tolerance to formalise the notions of attack tolerance and attack
vulnerability with a given impact p. In particular, a system M is said to be vul-
nerable to an attack A in the time intervalm..n with impact p if the perturbation
introduced by A becomes observable in the m-th time slot and yields the maxi-
mum impact p in the n-th time slot. Here, we wish to stress that the vulnerability
window m..n is quite informative. In practise, this interval says when an attack
will produce observable effects on the system under attack. Thus, if n is finite
we have an attack with temporary effects, otherwise we have an attack with per-
manent effects. Furthermore, if the attack is quick enough, and terminates well
before the time instant m, then we have a stealthy attack that affects the system
late enough to allow attack camouflages [14]. On the other hand, if at time m
the attack is far from termination, then the IoT system under attack has good
chances of undertaking countermeasures to stop the attack.
As a case study, we have estimated the impact of two cyber-physical attacks
on sensors that introduce false positives and false negatives, respectively, into
a simple surveillance system, affecting the integrity and the availability of the
IoT system. Although our attacks are quite simple, the specification language
and the corresponding metric semantics presented in the paper allow us to deal
with smarter attacks, such as periodic attacks with constant or variable period of
attack. Moreover, we can easily extend our threat model to recover (well-known)
attacks on communication channels.
Related work. We are aware of a number of works using formal methods for
CPS security, although they apply methods, and most of the time have goals,
that are quite different from ours.
Burmester et al. [3] employed hybrid timed automata to give a threat model
based on the traditional Byzantine fault model for crypto-security. However,
as remarked in [36], cyber-physical attacks and faults have inherently distinct
characteristics. In fact, unlike faults, cyber-physical attacks may be performed
over a significant number of attack points and in a coordinated way.
In [40], Vigo presented an attack scenario that addresses some of the pecu-
liarities of a cyber-physical adversary, and discussed how this scenario relates to
other attack models popular in the security protocol literature. Then, in [41,42]
Vigo et al. proposed an untimed calculus of broadcasting processes equipped
with notions of failed and unwanted communication. They focus on DoS attacks
without taking into consideration timing aspects or attack impact.
Bodei et al. [1,2] proposed an untimed process calculus, IoT-LySa, supporting
a control flow analysis that safely approximates the abstract behaviour of IoT
systems. Essentially, they track how data spread from sensors to the logics of
the network, and how physical data are manipulated.
Rocchetto and Tippenhaur [32] introduced a taxonomy of the diverse attacker
models proposed for CPS security and outline requirements for generalised at-
tacker models; in [31], they then proposed an extended Dolev-Yao attacker model
suitable for CPSs. In their approach, physical layer interactions are modelled as
abstract interactions between logical components to support reasoning on the
physical-layer security of CPSs. This is done by introducing additional orthogo-
nal channels. Time is not represented.
Nigam et al. [28] worked around the notion of Timed Dolev-Yao Intruder
Models for Cyber-Physical Security Protocols by bounding the number of in-
truders required for the automated verification of such protocols. Following a
tradition in security protocol analysis, they provide an answer to the question:
How many intruders are enough for verification and where should they be placed?
Their notion of time is somehow different from ours, as they focus on the time a
message needs to travel from an agent to another. The paper does not mention
physical devices, such as sensors and/or actuators.
Finally, Lanotte et al. [23] defined a hybrid process calculus to model both
CPSs and cyber-physical attacks; they defined a threat model for cyber-physical
attacks to physical devices and provided a proof methods to assess attack tol-
erance/vulnerability with respect to a timed trace semantics (no tolerance al-
lowed).
Future work. Recent works [22,11,24,25,12] have shown that bisimulation met-
rics are suitable for compositional reasoning, as the distance between two com-
plex systems can be often derived in terms of the distance between their com-
ponents. In this respect, Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 allows us compositional
reasonings when computing the impact of attacks on a target system, in terms
of the impact on its sub-systems. We believe that this result can be generalised
to estimate the impact of parallel attacks of the form A = A1 ‖ . . . ‖ Ak in terms
of the impacts of each malicious module Ai.
As future work, we also intend to adopt our impact metric in more involved
languages for cyber-physical systems and attacks, such as the language devel-
oped in [23], with an explicit representation of physical processes via differential
equations or their discrete counterpart, difference equations.
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A Proofs
To prove Theorem 1 we need some preliminary results. The first of these results
is Proposition 7 below, which states that the pseudometric property is preserved
by function K, namely K(d) is a pseudometric over D(T ) whenever d is a pseu-
dometric over T . Lemma 1 supports Proposition 7.
Lemma 1. Assume two functions d, d′ : T × T → [0, 1] with d(t, t′) ≤ d′(t, t′′) +
d′(t′′, t) for all terms t, t′, t′′ ∈ T . ThenK(d)(∆1, ∆2) ≤ K(d′)(∆1, ∆3)+K(d′)(∆3, ∆2)
for all distributions ∆1, ∆2, ∆3 ∈ D(T ).
Proof. Consider the function ω : T × T → [0, 1] defined for all terms t1, t2 ∈ T
as
ω(t1, t2) =
∑
t3∈T |∆3(t3) 6=0
ω1(t1, t3) · ω2(t3, t2)
∆3(t3)
with ω1 ∈ Ω(∆1, ∆3) one of the optimal matchings realising K(d′)(∆1, ∆3), and
ω2 ∈ Ω(∆3, ∆2) one of the optimal matchings realising K(d′)(∆3, ∆2). We will
prove that:
1. ω is a matching in Ω(∆1, ∆2), and
2.
∑
t1,t2∈T
ω(t1, t2) · d(t1, t2) ≤ K(d′)(∆1, ∆3) +K(d′)(∆3, ∆2).
By property 1 we infer K(d)(∆1, ∆2) ≤
∑
t1,t2∈T
ω(t1, t2) · d(t1, t2), then by
property 2 we infer the thesis K(d)(∆1, ∆2) ≤ K(d′)(∆1, ∆3) +K(d′)(∆3, ∆2).
To show (1) we prove that the left marginal of ω is ∆1 by∑
t2∈T
ω(t1, t2)
=
∑
t2∈T
∑
t3∈T |∆3(t3) 6=0
ω1(t1,t3)·ω2(t3,t2)
∆3(t3)
=
∑
t3∈T |∆3(t3) 6=0
ω1(t1,t3)·∆3(t3)
∆3(t3)
(by ω2 ∈ Ω(∆3, ∆2))
=
∑
t3∈T |∆3(t3) 6=0
ω1(t1, t3)
= ∆1(t1) (by ω1 ∈ Ω(∆1, ∆3))
and we observe that the proof that the right marginal of ω is ∆2 is analogous.
Then, we show (2) by∑
t1,t2∈T
ω(t1, t2) · d(t1, t2)
=
∑
t1,t2∈T
∑
t3∈T |∆3(t3) 6=0
ω1(t1,t3)·ω2(t3,t2)
∆3(t3)
· d(t1, t2)
≤
∑
t1,t2∈T ,t3∈T |∆3(t3) 6=0
ω1(t1,t3)·ω2(t3,t2)
∆3(t3)
· d′(t1, t3) +∑
t1,t2∈T ,t3∈T |∆3(t3) 6=0
ω1(t1,t3)·ω2(t3,t2)
∆3(t3)
· d′(t3, t2)
=
∑
t1,t3∈T
ω1(t1,t3)·∆3(t3)
∆3(t3)
· d′(t1, t3) +
∑
t2,t3∈T
∆3(t3)·ω2(t3,t2)
∆3(t3)
· d′(t3, t2)
=
∑
t1,t3∈T
ω1(t1, t3) · d′(t1, t3) +
∑
t2,t3∈T
ω2(t3, t2) · d′(t3, t2)
= K(d′)(∆1, ∆3) +K(d
′)(∆3, ∆2)
where the inequality follows from the hypothesis and the third last equality
follows by ω2 ∈ Ω(∆3, ∆2) and ω1 ∈ Ω(∆1, ∆2). ⊓⊔
Proposition 7. If d : T × T → [0, 1] is a 1-bounded pseudometric over T , then
K(d) : D(T )×D(T )→ [0, 1] is a 1-bounded pseudometric over D(T ).
Proof. We have to prove that K(d) satisfies the three properties in Definition 2.
To show K(d)(∆,∆) = 0 it is enough to take the matching ω ∈ Ω(∆,∆)
defined by ω(t, t) = ∆(t), for all t ∈ T , and ω(t, t′) = 0, for all t, t′ ∈ T with t 6= t′.
In fact, we obtain K(d)(∆,∆) = 0 by K(d)(∆,∆) ≤
∑
t,t′∈T ω(t, t
′) · d(t, t′) =∑
t∈T ∆(t) · d(t, t) = 0, with the last equality from the property d(t, t) = 0 of
the pseudometric d.
To show the symmetry property K(d)(∆1, ∆2) = K(d)(∆2, ∆1) it is enough
to observe that for any matching ω ∈ Ω(∆1, ∆2), the function ω′ : T ×T → [0, 1]
defined for all processes t1, t2 ∈ T as ω′(t1, t2) = ω(t2, t1), is a matching in
Ω(∆2, ∆1). In fact, by exploiting this property, given one of the optimal match-
ing ω ∈ Ω(∆1, ∆2) realising K(d)(∆1, ∆2) we get
K(d)(∆1, ∆2)
=
∑
t1,t2∈T
ω(t1, t2) · d(t1, t2)
=
∑
t2,t1∈T
ω′(t2, t1) · d(t2, t1)
≥ K(d)(∆2, ∆1)
with the second equality from the symmetry property d(t1, t2) = d(t2, t1) of the
pseudometric d. Then, by exchanging the role of∆1 and∆2 we getK(d)(∆2, ∆1) ≥
K(d)(∆1, ∆2), thus giving K(d)(∆1, ∆2) = K(d)(∆2, ∆1).
We conclude by observing that the triangular property K(d)(∆1, ∆2) ≤
K(d)(∆1, ∆3) +K(d)(∆3, ∆2) is an instance of Lemma 1, which can be applied
since the hypothesis d(t, t′) ≤ d(t, t′′) + d(t′′, t′) for all t, t′, t′′ ∈ T follows from
the triangular property of the pseudometric d. ⊓⊔
Now we prove that for all k ≥ 1, the function mk is a fixed point of B.
Lemma 2. For all k ≥ 1, B(mk) =mk
Proof. First we note that structure ({d : T × T → [0, 1] | Btick(mk−1) ⊑ d},⊑),
with d1 ⊑ d2 iff d1(t, t′) ≤ d2(t, t′) for all t, t′ ∈ T , is a complete lattice. In-
deed, for each set D ⊆ [0, 1]T ×T , the supremum and infimum are defined as
sup(D)(t, t′) = supd∈D d(t, t
′) and inf(D)(t, t′) = infd∈D d(t, t
′), for all t, t′ ∈ T .
The infimum of the lattice is clearly Btick(m
k−1). Being B monotone, by the
Knaster-Tarski theorem B has a least fixed point. Since our pLTS is image-finite,
and all transitions lead to distributions with finite support, with arguments anal-
ogous to those used in [38] it is possible to prove that B is continuous and its clo-
sure ordinal is ω, thus implying that its least fixed point is the supremum of the
Kleene ascending chain Btick(m
k−1) ⊑ B(Btick(mk−1)) ⊑ B
2(Btick(m
k−1)) ⊑
. . . = mk,0 ⊑mk,1 ⊑mk,2 ⊑ . . ., and, by definition, the supremum of this chain
is mk.
Now we exploit Lemma 2 to prove that for arbitrary processes t, t′ ∈ T ,
process t′ is able to simulate transitions of the form t
αˆ
=⇒ ∆, besides those of the
form t
α
−→ ∆, when α 6= tick.
Lemma 3. Given two arbitrary terms t, t′ ∈ T , whenever t
αˆ
=⇒ ∆ for α 6= tick,
we have:
inf
t′
αˆ
=⇒Θ
K(mk)(∆+ (1− |∆|)Dead, Θ + (1− |Θ|)Dead) ≤mk(t, t′)
Proof. The thesis is immediate if mk(t, t′) = 1. Consider the case mk(t, t′) < 1.
We reason by induction on the length n of t
αˆ
=⇒ ∆.
Base case n = 1. In this case t
αˆ
=⇒ ∆ is directly derived from t
αˆ
−→ ∆. There
are two sub-cases. The first is α = τ and ∆ = t, the second is t
α
−→ ∆, with α an
arbitrary action in A \ {tick}. In the former case, by the definition of the weak
transition relation
τ̂
−−→ we have that t′
τ̂
−−→ t′ and, consequently, t′
τ̂
=⇒ t′. The
thesis holds for distribution Θ = t′. More precisely, we have thatK(mk)(t+(1− |
t|)Dead, t′ + (1− |t′ |)Dead) = K(mk)(t, t′) = mk(t, t′). In the latter case, the
thesis follows directly by Definition 5 and Lemma 2. In detail, Definition 5 gives
inf
t′
αˆ
=⇒Θ
K(mk)(∆,Θ + (1− |Θ|)Dead) ≤ B(mk)(t, t′)
and Lemma 2 gives B(mk)(t, t′) =mk(t, t′).
Inductive step n > 1. The derivation t
αˆ
=⇒ ∆ is obtained by t
βˆ1
==⇒ ∆′ and
∆′
βˆ2
−−→ ∆, for some distribution ∆′ ∈ D(T ) and actions β1, β2 ∈ A \ {tick}. We
have two sub-cases. The first is β1 = τ and β2 = α, the other is β1 = α and
β2 = τ . We consider the case β1 = τ and β2 = α, the other is analogous.
The length of derivation t
βˆ1
==⇒ ∆′ is n − 1. Therefore, by the inductive
hypothesis we have
inf
t′
βˆ1==⇒Θ′
K(mk)(∆′ + (1− |∆′|)Dead, Θ′ + (1− |Θ′|)Dead) ≤mk(t, t′) (1)
Notice that mk(t, t′) < 1 and Equation 1 ensure that the set {Θ′ | t′
βˆ1
==⇒ Θ′}
is not be empty. Moreover, being β1 = τ , we have that |∆′ |= 1 and, for each
transition t′
βˆ1
==⇒ Θ′, also |Θ′|= 1. Therefore, the inductive hypothesis Equation 1
instantiates to
inf
t′
βˆ1==⇒Θ′
K(mk)(∆′, Θ′) ≤mk(t, t′) (2)
The sub-distribution ∆′ is of the form ∆′ =
∑
i∈I pi · ti for suitable processes
t′i and, by definition of transition relation
βˆ2
−−→, the transition∆′
βˆ2
−−→ ∆ is derived
from a β2-transition by some of the processes ti, namely I is partitioned into sets
I1 ∪ I2 such that: (i) for all i ∈ I1 we have ti
β2
−−→ ∆i for suitable distributions
∆i, (ii) for each i ∈ I2 we have ti
β2
−−→6 , and (iii) ∆ =
∑
i∈I1
pi ·∆i.
Let us fix an arbitrary transition t′
βˆ1
==⇒ Θ′ (remember we argued above that
it is not possible that there are none). The sub-distribution Θ′ is of the form
Θ′ =
∑
j∈J qj · t
′
j , for suitable processes t
′
j . Then, J can be partitioned into sets
J1 ∪ J2 such that for all j ∈ J1 we have t′j
βˆ2
==⇒ Θj for suitable distributions
Θj and for each j ∈ J2 we have t′j
βˆ2
==⇒6 . If J1 6= ∅ this gives Θ′
βˆ2
==⇒ Θ with
Θ =
∑
j∈J1
qj · Θj . Since we had t′
βˆ1
==⇒ Θ′, we can conclude t′
αˆ
=⇒ Θ. Notice
that we are sure that there exist some some Θ′ with t′
βˆ1
==⇒ Θ′ for which J1 6= ∅.
Indeed, if for all Θ′ with t′
βˆ1
==⇒ Θ′ we had J1 = ∅, this would cause t
αˆ
=⇒6 , giving
B(mk)(t, t′) = 1 and contradicting B(mk)(t, t′) = mk(t, t′) < 1. We remark
that in all cases where J1 6= ∅, the weak transition t′
αˆ
=⇒ Θ is obtained by
firstly choosing one of the available weak transitions labelled βˆ1 from t
′, namely
t′
βˆ1
==⇒ Θ′, and, then, by choosing one of the available weak transitions labelled
β2 from t
′
j , namely t
′
j
βˆ2
==⇒ Θj , for all j ∈ J1.
For the transition t′
βˆ1
==⇒ Θ′ fixed above, let ω be one of the optimal matchings
realising K(mk)(∆′, Θ′). We can rewrite the distributions ∆′ and Θ′ as ∆′ =∑
i∈I,j∈J ω(ti, t
′
j) · ti and Θ
′ =
∑
i∈I,j∈J ω(ti, t
′
j) · t
′
j . For all i ∈ I1 and j ∈ J ,
define ∆i,j = ∆i. We can rewrite∆ as∆ =
∑
i∈I1,j∈J
ω(ti, t
′
j)·∆i,j . Analogously,
for each j ∈ J1 and i ∈ I we note that the transition qjt′j
βˆ2
==⇒ qj ·Θj can always
be split into
∑
i∈I ω(ti, t
′
j)t
′
j
βˆ2
==⇒
∑
i∈I ω(ti, t
′
j) · Θi,j so that we can rewrite Θj
as Θj =
∑
i∈I ω(ti, t
′
j) · Θi,j and Θ as Θ =
∑
i∈I,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j) · Θi,j . Then we
note that for all i ∈ I1 and j ∈ J1, all transition t
′
j
βˆ2
==⇒ Θi,j ensure that
inf
t′j
βˆ2==⇒Θi,j
K(mk)(∆i,j , Θi,j + (1− |Θi,j|)Dead) ≤m
k(ti, t
′
j) (3)
Indeed, by definition of B, whenever ti
β2
−−→ ∆i = ∆i,j we have
inf
t′j
βˆ2==⇒Θi,j
K(mk)(∆i,j , Θi,j + (1− |Θi,j|)Dead) ≤ B(m
k)(ti, t
′
j)
Then, being mk a fixed point of B we have B(mk)(ti, t
′
j) = m
k(ti, t
′
j) and
Equation 3 follows.
Consider any j ∈ J1 and i ∈ I1. By Equation 3 andB(mk)(ti, t′j) =m
k(ti, t
′
j),
we infer that if if mk(ti, t
′
j) < 1, then the set of the weak transitions labelled
βˆ2 from t
′
j cannot be empty. For any transition t
′
i
βˆ2
==⇒ Θi,j , let ωi,j be one
of the optimal matchings realising K(mk)(∆i,j , Θi,j + (1− |Θi,j |)Dead). Define
ω′ : T × T → [0, 1] as the function such that for arbitrary processes u, v ∈ T we
have:
ω′(u, v) =


∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)ωi,j(u, v) if u 6= Dead 6= v∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)ωi,j(u, v) +
∑
i∈I1,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j)∆i,j(u) if u 6= Dead = v∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)ωi,j(u, v) +
∑
i∈I2,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)Θi,j(v) if u = Dead 6= v∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)ωi,j(u, v) +
∑
i∈I1,j∈J2
ω(ti, tj)∆i,j(u)+∑
i∈I2,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)Θi,j(v) +
∑
i∈I2,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j) if u = Dead = v.
To infer the proof obligation
inf
t′
αˆ
=⇒Θ
K(mk)(∆+ (1− |∆|)Dead, Θ + (1− |Θ|)Dead) ≤mk(t, t′) (4)
it is now enough to show that:
1. the function ω′ is a matching in Ω(∆+ (1− |∆|)Dead, Θ + (1− |Θ|)Dead)
2.
inf
t′
βˆ1==⇒Θ′
Θ′=
∑
j∈J1∪J2
qjδ(t
′
j
)
t′
j
βˆ2==⇒Θi,j
∑
u,v∈T
ω′(u, v) ·mk(u, v) ≤mk(t, t′) (5)
To show property 1 we prove that the left marginal of ω′ is ∆+(1− |∆|)Dead.
The proof that the right marginal is Θ + (1− |Θ |)Dead is analogous. For any
process u 6= Dead we have∑
v∈T ω
′(u, v)
=
∑
v 6=Dead
∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)ωi,j(u, v)
+
∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)ωi,j(u,Dead) +
∑
i∈I1,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j)∆i,j(u)
=
∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)
∑
v∈T ωi,j(u, v) +
∑
i∈I1,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j)∆i,j(u)
=
∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)∆i,j(u) +
∑
i∈I1,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j)∆i,j(u)
=
∑
i∈I1,j∈J
ω(ti, t
′
j)∆i,j(u)
=
∑
i∈I1
pi∆i(u)
= ∆(u)
= (∆+ (1− |∆|)Dead)(u)
with the third equality from the fact that ωi,j is a matching in Ω(∆i,j , Θi,j), the
fourth equality by J = J1 ∪ J2 and the fifth equality by
∑
j∈J ω(ti, t
′
j) = pi and
∆i,j = ∆i. Consider now Dead. We have∑
v∈T ω
′(Dead, v)
=
∑
v 6=Dead
∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)ωi,j(Dead, v) +
∑
v 6=Dead
∑
i∈I2,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)Θi,j(v)
+
∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)ωi,j(Dead,Dead) +
∑
i∈I1,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j)∆i,j(Dead)
+
∑
i∈I2,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)Θi,j(Dead) +
∑
i∈I2,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j)
=
∑
v∈T
∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)ωi,j(Dead, v) +
∑
v∈T
∑
i∈I2,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)Θi,j(v)
+
∑
i∈I1,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j)∆i,j(Dead) +
∑
i∈I2,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j)
=
∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)∆i,j(Dead) +
∑
i∈I2,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)
+
∑
i∈I1,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j)∆i,j(Dead) +
∑
i∈I2,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j)
=
∑
i∈I1,j∈J
ω(ti, t
′
j)∆i,j(Dead) +
∑
i∈I2,j∈J
ω(ti, t
′
j)
=
∑
i∈I1
pi∆i(Dead) +
∑
i∈I2
pi
= (∆+ (1− |∆|)Dead)(Dead)
where the third equality by the fact that ωi,j is a matching in Ω(∆i,j , Θi,j) and
the fact that Θi,j is a distribution, the fourth equality by J = J1 ∪ J2, the fifth
equality by
∑
j∈J ω(ti, t
′
j) = pi and ∆i,j = ∆i and the last equality follows from∑
i∈I1,j∈J
ω(si, tj) =
∑
i∈I1
pi =|∆|.
Summarising, for all processes u ∈ T we have proved that
∑
v∈T ω
′(u, v) =
(∆+(1− |∆|)Dead)(u), thus confirming that the left marginal of ω′ is ∆+(1− |
∆|)Dead.
To prove (2), by looking at the definition of ω′ given above we get that∑
u,v∈T ω
′(u, v) ·mk(u, v) is the summation of the following values:
–
∑
u6=Dead 6=v
∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)ωi,j(u, v)m
k(u, v)
–
∑
u6=Dead
∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)ωi,j(u,Dead)m
k(u,Dead) +∑
i∈I1,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j)∆i,j(u)m
k(u,Dead)
–
∑
v 6=Dead
∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)ωi,j(Dead, v)m
k(Dead, v) +∑
i∈I2,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)Θi,j(v)m
k(Dead, v)
–
∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)ωi,j(Dead,Dead)m
k(Dead,Dead) +∑
i∈I1,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j)∆i,j(Dead)m
k(Dead,Dead) +∑
i∈I2,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)Θi,j(Dead)m
k(Dead,Dead)+∑
i∈I2,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j)m
k(Dead,Dead).
By moving the first summand of the second, third and fourth items to the
first item, we rewrite this summation as the summation of the following values:
–
∑
u,v∈T
∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)ωi,j(u, v)m
k(u, v)
–
∑
i∈I1,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j)∆i,j(u)m
k(u,Dead)
–
∑
i∈I2,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)Θi,j(v)m
k(Dead, v)
–
∑
i∈I1,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j)∆i,j(Dead)m
k(Dead,Dead) +∑
i∈I2,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)Θi,j(v)m
k(Dead,Dead) +∑
i∈I2,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j)m
k(Dead,Dead).
Since the function ωi,j was defined as one of the optimal matchings real-
ising K(mk)(∆i,j , Θi,j + (1− |Θi,j |)Dead), the first item can be rewritten as∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)K(m
k)(∆i,j , Θi,j+(1− |Θi,j|)Dead). From Equation 3 we get
inf
t′j
βˆ2==⇒Θi,j
K(mk)(∆i,j , Θi,j + (1− |Θi,j |)Dead)) ≤ mk(ti, t′j). Henceforth the
infimum for all t′j
βˆ2
==⇒ Θi,j of the first item is less or equal
∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j) ·
mk(ti, t
′
j). The second item is clearly less or equal than
∑
i∈I1,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j). The
third item is clearly less or equal than
∑
i∈I2,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j). Finally, the last item
is 0 since mk(Dead,Dead) = 0. Namely, the infimum for all t′j
βˆ2
==⇒ Θi,j of∑
u,v∈T ω
′(u, v) ·mk(u, v) is bounded by the summation of the following three
values:
–
∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)m
k(ti, t
′
j)
–
∑
i∈I1,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j)
–
∑
i∈I2,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j).
Formally:
inf
t′j
βˆ2==⇒Θi,j
∑
u,v∈T
ω′(u, v) ·mk(u, v)
≤
∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)m
k(ti, t
′
j) +
∑
i∈I1,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j) +
∑
i∈I2,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)
(6)
Then, since K(mk)(∆′, Θ′) is the summation of the following values:
–
∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)m
k(ti, t
′
j)
–
∑
i∈I1,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j)m
k(ti, t
′
j) =
∑
i∈I1,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j) (since ti
β2
−−→ and t′j
βˆ2
==⇒6
give mk(ti, t
′
j) = 1)
–
∑
i∈I2,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j)m
k(ti, t
′
j) =
∑
i∈I2,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j) (since t
′
j
β2
−−→ and ti
βˆ2
==⇒6
give mk(ti, t
′
j) = 1)
–
∑
i∈I2,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j)m
k(ti, t
′
j)
we infer that the right hand side of Equation 6
∑
i∈I1,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j) ·m
k(ti, t
′
j) +∑
i∈I1,j∈J2
ω(ti, t
′
j) +
∑
i∈I2,j∈J1
ω(ti, t
′
j) is less or equal than K(m
k)(∆′, Θ′).
Together with Equation 6 this gives
inf
t′j
βˆ2==⇒Θi,j
∑
u,v∈T
ω′(u, v) ·mk(u, v) ≤ K(mk)(∆′, Θ′) (7)
which, together with Equation 2 gives Equation 5, which concludes the proof.
⊓⊔
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof (of Theorem 1). We have to prove that mk satisfies the three properties
in Definition 2. Properties mk(t, t) = 0 and mk(t, t′) = mk(t′, t) for all t, t′ ∈
T are immediate. The interesting case is the triangular property mk(t, t′) ≤
mk(t, t′′) + mk(t′′, t′) for all t, t′, t′′ ∈ T . To this purpose, let us define the
function m : T × T → [0, 1] such that
m(t, t′) = min
(
mk(t, t′), inf
t′′∈T
(mk(t, t′′) +mk(t′′, t′))
)
.
We will prove that m = mk. By the definition of m, this gives mk(t, t′) ≤
mk(t, t′′) +mk(t′′, t′) for all t′′ ∈ T , thus confirming that also the triangular
property holds for mk.
In order to prove m = mk, we observe first that relation m ⊑ mk follows
immediately by the definition of m. It remains to prove mk ⊑ m. To this pur-
pose we prove that: (i) mk is the least prefixed point of the functional B on
the complete lattice ({d : T × T → [0, 1] : Btick(mk−1) ⊑ d},⊑), and (ii) m is a
prefixed point of the same functional on the same lattice.
Let us start with property (i) By Lemma 2, mk is the least fixed point of the
functional B, which is monotone and continuous in the lattice. This coincides
with the least prefixed point.
Let us consider now (ii). We have to prove B(m) ⊑ m, namely, whenever
m(t, t′) < 1, then, for all α 6= tick we have
∀t
α
−−→ ∆. inf
t′
αˆ
=⇒Θ
K(m)(∆,Θ + (1− |Θ|)Dead) ≤m(t, t′). (8)
To prove Equation 8 we distinguish two cases, namely m(t, t′) = mk(t, t′) and
m(t, t′) = inft′′∈T (m
k(t, t′′) +mk(t′′, t′)).
Assume first m(t, t′) =mk(t, t′). In this case, being mk the least fixed point
of B, t
α
−−→ ∆ implies that
inf
t′
αˆ
=⇒Θ
K(mk)(∆,Θ + (1− |Θ|)Dead) ≤ B(mk)(t, t′) =mk(t, t′) =m(t, t′)
Since K is monotone and m ⊑mk, we infer
inf
t′
αˆ
=⇒Θ
K(m)(∆,Θ + (1− |Θ|)Dead) ≤m(t, t′)
thus giving Equation 8.
Assume now m(t, t′) = inft′′∈T (m
k(t, t′′) +mk(t′′, t′)). Since m(t, t′) < 1,
there exist terms t′′ ∈ T with mk(t, t′′) +mk(t′′, t′) < 1, thus implying both
mk(t, t′′) < 1 and mk(t′′, t′) < 1. By Lemma 3, from mk(t, t′′) < 1 and t
α
−−→ ∆
we infer
inf
t′′
αˆ
=⇒Φ
K(mk)(∆,Φ + (1− |Φ|)Dead) ≤mk(t, t′′)
By Lemma 3, from mk(t′′, t′) < 1, for all t′′
αˆ
==⇒ Φ we have
inf
t′
αˆ
=⇒Θ
K(mk)(Φ + (1− |Φ|)Dead, Θ + (1− |Θ|)Dead) ≤mk(t′′, t′)
By the definition of m and Lemma 1 we have K(mk)(∆,Φ + (1− |Φ|)Dead) +
K(mk)(Φ + (1− |Φ|)Dead), Θ + (1− |Θ|)Dead) ≥ K(m)(∆,Θ + (1− |Θ|)Dead).
We derive
inf
t′′
αˆ=⇒Φ
t′
αˆ=⇒Θ
K(m)(∆,Θ + (1− |Θ|)Dead) ≤mk(t, t′′) +mk(t′′, t′)
and, by definition of infimum,
inf
t′′
αˆ=⇒Φ
t′
αˆ=⇒Θ
K(m)(∆,Θ + (1− |Θ|)Dead) ≤m(t, t′)
which gives Equation 8 and concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
We prove now Proposition 2.
Proof (of Proposition 2). We prove the first item, then the second item follows
by the first and the result t ≃0 t′ iff t ≈ t′ given in [8]. First we recall that
t ≃p t′ iff m(t, t′) = p, where m is the least fixed point (and also least prefixed
point) in the lattice ([0, 1]T ×T ,⊑) of a functional B′ such that B′(d)(t, t′) =
max(B(d)(t, t′),Btick(d)(t, t
′)) for all t, t′ ∈ T and d ∈ [0, 1]T ×T . Therefore, we
have to prove that m∞ =m.
Let us start with m∞ ⊑m. Being m∞ the supremum of all mk, it is enough
to show mk ⊑ m for all k ∈ IN. This property can be shown by induction
over k. The base case is immediate since m0 = 0. Consider the inductive step
k+1. Functionmk+1 is obtained as supn→∞B
n(Btick(m
k)). Assume any n ∈ IN.
By B′ ≥ B,Btick we get B
n(Btick(m
k)) ⊑ (B′)n+1(mk) for all n ∈ IN. By the
monotonicity ofB′ and the inductive hypothesismk ⊑m, we get (B′)n+1(mk) ⊑
(B′)n+1(m). Finally, since m is a fixed point of B′ we infer (B′)n+1(m) = m.
Summarising, Bn(Btick(m
k)) ⊑m. By the arbitrarity of n we infer m∞ ⊑m.
Let us show now m ⊑ m∞. Being m the least prefixed point of B′, it is
enough to show thatm∞ is a prefixed point of B′. We have both m∞ ⊒ B(m∞)
and m∞ ⊒ Btick(m∞), thus giving m∞ ⊒ B
′(m∞), confirming that m∞ is a
prefixed point of B′. ⊓⊔
Now we prove Theorem 2.
Proof (of Theorem 2). We prove the second item. The proof of the third item is
analogous, then the first item is a consequence of the others. To prove the thesis
we can prove that for all k ∈ IN we have
mk(ξ⋊⋉P1 ‖ P2 ‖ A, ξ⋊⋉P1 ‖ P2)
≤ mk(ξ⋊⋉P1 ‖ A, ξ⋊⋉P1) +m
k(ξ⋊⋉P2 ‖ A, ξ⋊⋉P2)
− (mk(ξ⋊⋉P1 ‖ A, ξ⋊⋉P1) ·m
k(ξ⋊⋉P2 ‖ A, ξ⋊⋉P2))
Since ξ⋊⋉P1 ‖ P2 ‖ A can mimic all the behaviours by ξ⋊⋉P1 ‖ P2, the distance
mk(ξ⋊⋉P1 ‖ P2 ‖ A, ξ⋊⋉P1 ‖ P2) is given by the behaviours by ξ⋊⋉P1 ‖ P2 ‖ A
that are not mimicked by ξ⋊⋉P1 ‖ P2. Then, since ξ⋊⋉P1 ‖ A ‖ P2 ‖ A can
mimic all the behaviours by ξ⋊⋉P1 ‖ P2 ‖ A, we have that
mk(ξ⋊⋉P1 ‖ P2 ‖ A, ξ⋊⋉P1 ‖ P2) ≤m
k(ξ⋊⋉P1 ‖ A ‖ P2 ‖ A, ξ⋊⋉P1 ‖ P2)
thus implying that to have the proof obligation we can prove the stronger prop-
erty
mk(ξ⋊⋉P1 ‖ A ‖ P2 ‖ A, ξ⋊⋉P1 ‖ P2)
≤ mk(ξ⋊⋉P1 ‖ A, ξ⋊⋉P1) +m
k(ξ⋊⋉P2 ‖ A, ξ⋊⋉P2)
− (mk(ξ⋊⋉P1 ‖ A, ξ⋊⋉P1) ·m
k(ξ⋊⋉P2 ‖ A, ξ⋊⋉P2)).
More in general, we prove
mk(ξ⋊⋉Q1 ‖ Q2, ξ⋊⋉P1 ‖ P2)
≤ mk(ξ⋊⋉Q1, ξ⋊⋉P1) +m
k(ξ⋊⋉Q2, ξ⋊⋉P2)
− (mk(ξ⋊⋉Q1, ξ⋊⋉P1) ·m
k(ξ⋊⋉Q2, ξ⋊⋉P2))
for arbitrary Q1 and Q2, written also
mk(M1 ‖M2, N1 ‖ N2) ≤
mk(M1, N1) +m
k(M2, N2)− (m
k(M1, N1) ·m
k(M2, N2)).
(9)
To this purpose, first we need to introduce the notion of congruence closure
for mk as the quantitative analogue of the well-known concept of congruence
closure of a process equivalence. We define the metric congruence closure of mk
for operator ‖ w.r.t. the bound provided in Equation 9 as a function m assigning
to each pair of systems a distance in [0, 1] given by
m(M,N) =


min(m(M1, N1) +m(M2, N2)− (m(M1, N1)m(M2, N2)),mk(M,N))
if
[
M = M1 ‖M2 ∧N = N1 ‖ N2 ∧
mk(M1, N1) < 1 ∧mk(M2, N2) < 1
mk(M,N) otherwise
We note thatm satisfies by constructionm(M1 ‖M1, N1 ‖ N2) ≤ m(M1, N1)+
m(M2, N2) − (m(M1, N1) · m(M2, N2)). We note also that m satisfies by con-
struction m ⊑ mk. It remains to show that mk ⊑ m, thus giving mk = m,
and Equation 9 holds. Since mk is the least prefixed point of B over the lat-
tice ({d : T × T → [0, 1] | Btick(mk−1) ⊑ d},⊑) to show mk ⊑ m it is enough to
prove that m is a prefixed point of the same functional on the same lattice.
To prove that B(m) ⊑ m we need to show that m satisfies the transfer
condition of the bisimulation metrics, namely
∀M
α
−−→ γ. ∃M ′
α
==⇒ γ′. K(m)(γ, γ′ + (1− | γ′ |)Dead) ≤ m(M,M ′) (10)
for all systems M,M with m(M,M ′) < 1 and α 6= tick.
This can be proved by applying the same arguments used to prove Proposi-
tion 3.2 in [11]. ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 3 First we observe that in the evolution of both sys-
tems ξ⋊⋉Ctrli and ξ⋊⋉Ctrli ‖ Afp〈i,m, n〉 it never happens that there are more
than two instantaneous actions in between any two tick actions. This implies
that for all j ∈ IN, system M reachable from ξ⋊⋉Ctrli and system N reach-
able from ξ⋊⋉Ctrli ‖ Afp〈i,m, n〉, we have mj(M,N) = suph∈INm
j,h(M,N) =
mj,2(M,N). Then, the proof follows from the following 7 properties, by observ-
ing that first item of the thesis follows from the property expressed by item 1
below and the second and third items of the thesis follow from the property
expressed by item 7 below, when, respectively, j1 = j −m + 1 and j2 = m − 1.
For any j ∈ IN, it holds that:
1. mj,l(ξ⋊⋉P, ξ⋊⋉P ‖ Q) = 0 for any P and whenever process Q has the form
Q = tickj
′
.B〈i, n−m+ 1〉 for some j < j′.
2. mj,0(ξ⋊⋉P, ξ⋊⋉P ‖ Q) = 1 − (p+i )
j−1 whenever 0 < j ≤ n−m + 1, ξ(ri) =
absence, and the processes P and Q have the form P = tick.Ctrli and Q =
B〈i, n−m+ 1− j〉.
3. mj,1(ξ⋊⋉P, ξ⋊⋉P ‖ Q) = 1 − (p+i )
j−1 whenever 0 < j ≤ n−m + 1, ξ(ri) =
absence, and the processes P and Q have the form P = ci!on.tick.Ctrli and
Q = B〈i, 0, n−m+ 1− j〉.
4. mj(ξ⋊⋉P, ξ⋊⋉P ‖ Q) = 1−(p+i )
j whenever 0 < j ≤ n−m+1, ξ(ri) = absence,
and the processes P and Q have the form P = Ctrli and Q = B〈i, n−m+1〉.
5. mj,0(ξ⋊⋉P, ξ⋊⋉P ‖ Q) = 1 − (p+i )
j1 whenever processes P and Q have the
form P = tick.Ctrli and Q = tick
j2 .B〈i, n−m+1〉, for some 0 < j2 ≤ j such
that j1 = min(j − j2 + 1, n−m+ 1).
6. mj,1(ξ⋊⋉P, ξ⋊⋉P ‖ Q) = 1 − (p+i )
j1 whenever processes P has either the
form P = ci!on.tick.Ctrli or P = ci!off.tick.Ctrli , and process Q has the
form Q = tickj2 .B〈i, n − m + 1〉, for some 0 < j2 ≤ j such that j1 =
min(j − j2 + 1, n−m+ 1).
7. mj(ξ⋊⋉P, ξ⋊⋉P ‖ Q) = 1 − (p+i )
j1 whenever processes P and Q have the
form form P = Ctrli and Q = tick
j2 .B〈i, n −m + 1〉, for some 0 < j2 ≤ j
such that j1 = min(j − j2 + 1, n−m+ 1).
The seven properties above can be proved for allmj andmj,l by well founded
induction over the relation ≺ defined as follows:
– mj ≺m if m ∈ {mj
′
,mj
′,l} with j < j′
– mj,l ≺m if either m ∈ {mj
′
,mj
′,l} with j < j′, or, m = mj
′,l′ with j′ = j
and l < l′.
Obviously, ≺ is irreflexive and there does not exist any infinite descending chain
(the base case is m0).
The base case j = 0 is immediate since m0 is the constant zero function 0
and 1− (p+i )
0 = 0.
We consider the inductive step.
1. The thesis can be easily proved since Q can perform only tick actions and,
intuitively, it does not affect the behaviour of P .
In detail, for j = 1 and l = 0, we have that whenever ξ⋊⋉P
tick
−−−→
∑
i∈I ξi⋊⋉Pi,
then ξ⋊⋉P ‖ Q
tick
−−−→
∑
i∈I ξi⋊⋉Pi ‖ Q
′ with Q = tickj
′−1.B〈i, n −m + 1〉.
Hence the thesis follows, since m0(ξi ⋊⋉Pi, ξi⋊⋉Pi ‖ Q′) = 0 by definition of
m0.
Assume now l > 0. In this case, whenever ξ⋊⋉P
α
−−→
∑
i∈I ξ⋊⋉Pi with
α 6= tick, then ξ⋊⋉P ‖ Q
α
−−→
∑
i∈I ξ⋊⋉Pi ‖ Q. The thesis holds since, by
induction on case item 1, we have mj,l−1(ξ⋊⋉Pi, ξ⋊⋉Pi ‖ Q) = 0.
Similarly, for l = 0 and j > 1, whenever ξ⋊⋉P
tick
−−−→
∑
i∈I ξi⋊⋉Pi, then
ξ⋊⋉P ‖ Q
tick
−−−→
∑
i∈I ξi⋊⋉Pi ‖ Q
′ with Q′ = tickj
′−1.B〈i, n−m+1〉. Hence
the thesis holds since, by induction on case item 1, for any h, it holds that
mj−1,h(ξi⋊⋉Pi, ξi⋊⋉P ‖ Q′) = 0 thus implying that
mj−1(ξi⋊⋉Pi, ξi⋊⋉P ‖ Q′) = sup
h∈IN∞
mj−1,h(ξi⋊⋉Pi, ξi⋊⋉P ‖ Q′) = 0.
2. Define M = ξ⋊⋉P and N = ξ⋊⋉P ‖ Q. We have that mj.0(M,N) =
Btick(m
j−1)(M,N) = Btick(m
j−1,2)(M,N). Hence we have to prove that
Btick(m
j−1,2)(M,N) = 1 − (p+i )
j−1. Such a property follows by the follow-
ing two facts:
– max
M
tick−−→∆
min
N
tick
==⇒Θ
K(mj−1,2)(∆,Θ + (1− |Θ|)Dead) = 1− (p+i )
j−1
– max
N
tick−−→Θ
min
M
tick
==⇒∆
K(mj−1,2)(∆+ (1− |∆|)Dead, Θ) = 1− (p+i )
j−1.
We prove with the first case, the second one is similar.
The only transitions by M are of the form M
tick
−−−→ ξ′⋊⋉Ctrli with ξ′ ∈
next(ξ). The environments ξ′ ∈ next(ξ) maximising the set
min
N
tick
==⇒Θ
K(mj−1,2)(ξ′⋊⋉Ctrli , Θ)
are such that ξ′x(ri) = absence. Indeed the attacker could force N to perform
ci!on with probability equal to 1. If ξ
′(ri) = absence, then M will perform
ci!on with probability p
+
i . Hence M does not simulate N with a probability
1 − p+i . Otherwise, if ξ
′(ri) = presence, then M will perform ci!on with
probability 1 − p−i . Hence M does not simulate N with a probability p
−
i .
Since 0 ≤ p+i , p
−
i <
1
2 , then 1− p
+
i > p
−
i .
The system N = ξ⋊⋉P ‖ Q minimises
min
N
tick
==⇒Θ
K(mj−1,2)(ξ′⋊⋉Ctrli , Θ)
by simulating M with the transition N
tick
−−−→ ξ′⋊⋉Ctrli ‖ Q′ with Q
′ =
B〈i,max(0, n−m+ 1− j − 1)〉.
The only admissible matching ω for K(mj−1,2)(ξ′⋊⋉Ctrliξ′⋊⋉Ctrli ‖ Q′) is
such that ω(ξ′⋊⋉Ctrli , ξ′⋊⋉Ctrli ‖ Q′) = 1.
Summarising we have:
max
M
tick−−→∆
min
N
tick
==⇒Θ
K(mj−1,2)(∆,Θ + (1− |Θ|)Dead)
= min
N
tick
==⇒Θ
K(mj−1,2)(ξ′⋊⋉Ctrli , Θ) with ξ
′(ri) = absence
= K(mj−1,2)(ξ′⋊⋉Ctrli , ξ′⋊⋉Ctrli ‖ Q′)
=mj−1,2(ξ′⋊⋉Ctrli , ξ′⋊⋉Ctrli ‖ Q′) (by induct. on case item 4)
= 1− (p+i )
j−1
which completes the the proof.
3. Define M = ξ⋊⋉P and N = ξ⋊⋉P ‖ Q.
Analogously to item 2, to prove B(mj,0)(M,N) = 1− (p+i )
j−1 it is sufficient
to prove the following two facts:
– max
M
ci!on−−−→∆
min
N
ci!on===⇒Θ
K(mj,0)(∆,Θ+(1− |Θ|)Dead) = 1−(p+i )
j−1
– max
N
ci!on−−−→Θ
min
M
ci!on===⇒∆
K(mj,0)(∆+(1− |∆|)Dead, Θ) = 1−(p+i )
j−1.
We prove the first case, the second one is similar.
The only transition by M = ξ⋊⋉P is M
ci!on
−−−−→ ξ⋊⋉ tick.Ctrli . The only
transition by N = ξ⋊⋉P ‖ Q is N
ci!on
−−−−→ ξ⋊⋉ tick.Ctrli ‖ Q.
The only admissible matching ω forK(mj−1,0)(ξ⋊⋉ tick.Ctrli , ξ⋊⋉ tick.Ctrli ‖ Q)
is such that ω(ξ⋊⋉ tick.Ctrli , ξ⋊⋉ tick.Ctrli ‖ Q) = 1.
Summarising we have:
max
M
ci!on−−−→∆
min
N
ci!on===⇒Θ
K(mj−1,0)(∆,Θ + (1− |Θ|)Dead)
= min
N
ci!on===⇒Θ
K(mj−1,0)(ξ⋊⋉ tick.Ctrli , Θ)
= K(mj−1,0)(ξ⋊⋉ tick.Ctrli , ξ⋊⋉ tick.Ctrli ‖ Q)
=mj−1,0(ξ⋊⋉ tick.Ctrli , ξ⋊⋉ tick.Ctrli ‖ Q) (by induct. on case item 2)
= 1− (p+i )
j−1
which completes the the proof.
4. Define M = ξ⋊⋉P and N = ξ⋊⋉P ‖ Q.
Sincemj =mj,2, analogously to item 2, to proveB(mj,1)(M,N) = 1−(p+i )
j
it is sufficient to prove the following two facts:
– max
M
τ−→∆minN τ=⇒ΘK(m
j,1)(∆,Θ + (1− |Θ|)Dead) ≤ 1− (p+i )
j
– max
N
τ−→ΘminM τ=⇒∆K(m
j,1)(∆+ (1− |∆|)Dead, Θ) = 1− (p+i )
j .
The interesting case is the second. Indeed, N is always able to simulate M
by considering the case in which the controller reads the right value of the
sensor and does not take the value provided by the attacker. The system
N = ξ⋊⋉P ‖ Q can perform two transitions depending on the fact that
the controller reads or not the fake value provided by the attacker. But,
obviously, the system N = ξ⋊⋉P ‖ Q maximises
max
N
τ−→Θ
min
M
τ
=⇒∆
K(mj,1)(∆+ (1− |∆|)Dead, Θ)
when the controller reads the fake value, namely by the transition N
τ̂
=⇒
γN = N ′ where N
′ = ξ⋊⋉ ci!on.tick.Ctrli .
The system M = ξ⋊⋉P minimises
min
M
τ
=⇒∆
K(mj,1)(∆+ (1− |∆|)Dead, γN )
by simulating N by the transition
M
τ
−−→ γM = (p
+
i ) ·M1 + (1− p
+
i ) ·M2
where M1 = ξ⋊⋉ ci!on.tick.Ctrli and M2 = ξ⋊⋉ ci!off.tick.Ctrli .
Moreover, the only admissible matching ω for K(mj.1)(γM , γN ) is such that
ω(M1, N
′) = p+i and ω(M2, N
′) = 1− p+i .
Summarising:
max
N
τ−→ΘminM τ=⇒∆K(m
j,1)(∆ + (1− |∆|)Dead, Θ)
= min
M
τ
=⇒∆K(m
j,1)(∆+ (1− |∆|)Dead, γN )
= K(mj.1)(γM , γN )
= (p+i ) ·m
j,1(M1, N
′) + (1− p+i ) ·m
j,1(M2, N
′)
= (p+i ) · (1− (p
+
i )
j−1) + (1 − p+i ) · 1 (by induct. on case item 3)
= 1− (p+i )
j .
which completes the proof.
5. The proof is similar to the proof of item 2. Indeed this case can be proved by
induction on case item 4 if j = j1 and j2 = 1, and, on case item 7 if j2 > 1.
6. The proof is similar to the proof of item 3. Indeed this case can be proved
by induction on case item 5.
7. The proof is similar to the proof of item 4. Indeed this case can be proved
by induction on case item 6.
⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 5 The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3 by
considering p−i instead of p
+
i , and, C〈. . .〉 instead of B〈. . .〉. ⊓⊔
